4th Amendment<\/p>\n
\u201c[W]e conclude that fidgeting alone is insufficient to justify a Terry search for weapons.\u201d Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 237 (November 9, 2012).<\/em>
\n<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\nLicense \/ Fees to Exercise a Right<\/strong><\/p>\n
\u201cIt is contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant [319 U.S. 105, 113] if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax \u2013 a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cThe tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, the payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.\u201d<\/p>\n
U.S. Supreme Court\u00a0<\/em>
\n319 U.S. 105 (1943)\u00a0<\/em>
\nMURDOCK v. PENN\u00a0<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\nWeight Given to Attorney General Opinions<\/strong><\/p>\n
North Carolina<\/span><\/p>\n
“In summation, we conclude that the Secretary of Revenue’s interpretation of business income as defined under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u2002105-130.4(a)(1) is entitled to due consideration and considered prima facie correct. \u2002 This prima facie presumption is significant given Polaroid’s failure to adequately rebut the Secretary of Revenue’s interpretation. \u2002\u00a0Moreover, the General Assembly’s failure to amend N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u2002105-130.4(a)(1) demonstrates its implied acquiescence in the Secretary of Revenue’s interpretation, thereby providing further support for our conclusion that the North Carolina Corporate Income Tax Act defines business income in a manner encompassing both the transactional and functional tests<\/span><\/strong>.”\u00a0\u00a0http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/nc-supreme-court\/1069788.html<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Texas<\/span><\/p>\n
Attorney general opinions are persuasive and entitled to due consideration.\u00a0Comm’rs Court of Titus Cnty. v. Agan<\/em><\/strong>, 940 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex.1997); see also\u00a0City of Hous. v. Hous. Chronicle Publ’g Co.<\/em><\/strong>, 673 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (holding attorney general opinions should be given great weight).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Virginia<\/span><\/p>\n
“‘While it is not binding on this Court, an Opinion of the Attorney General is ‘entitled to due consideration.’\u00a0Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton<\/em><\/strong>, 255 Va. 387, 393, 497 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1998).\u00a0This is particularly so when the General Assembly has known of the Attorney General’s Opinion, in this case for five years, and has done nothing to change it. ‘The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney\u00a0 General’s interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view<\/span><\/strong>.’\u00a0Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth<\/em><\/strong>, 225 Va. 157, 161-62, 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983).”\u00a0\u00a0Beck v. Shelton<\/em><\/strong>, 593 S.E.2d 195, 198-200 (2004).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u00a0Nexus in a State For Sales Tax Purposes<\/strong><\/p>\n
Quill\u00a0Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Avoiding Arbitration<\/strong><\/p>\n
EA Independent Franchisee Association, LLC v Edible Arrangements International, Inc. et al, USDC (D-Connecticut, July 19, 2011) 2011 WL2938077<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
4th Amendment \u201c[W]e conclude that fidgeting alone is insufficient to justify a Terry search for weapons.\u201d Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 237 (November 9, 2012). License \/ Fees to Exercise a Right \u201cIt is contended, however, that the … Continue reading